Fair value accounting and procyclicality: mitigating regulatory and accounting policy differences through regulatory structure reforms and Enforced Self Regulation by Ojo, Marianne
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fair value accounting and procyclicality:
mitigating regulatory and accounting
policy differences through regulatory
structure reforms and Enforced Self
Regulation
Marianne Ojo
Oxford Brookes University
5 March 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29314/
MPRA Paper No. 29314, posted 9 March 2011 19:02 UTC
ABSTRACT
In what  ways  can  changes  to  the  structure  of  regulation  (as  well  as  other  regulatory reforms) 
mitigate  the  effects  of  policies  which  trigger  financial  instability?  More  specifically  policies, 
information  asymmetries  or  externalities  which  could  give  rise  to  bank  contagion, 
systemic/liquidity risks or procyclical effects?
Whilst acknowledging that accounting standards play a fundamental role in addressing problems 
which could contribute to information asymmetries and ultimately systemic risks, this paper also 
highlights  why  the  type  of  regulatory  structure,  clear  allocation  of  responsibilities  between 
regulators, as well as measures aimed at fostering accountability, constitute vital elements which 
could serve as safeguards in mitigating procyclical effects (as well as other factors) which could 
trigger financial instability. In achieving this aim, the paper focusses on the rationale for fair value 
accounting, as well as problematic issues arising from its implementation.
The adoption of international accounting standards is considered to have a vital role in contributing 
to financial stability. This paper will also illustrate how the implementation of accounting standards 
and  policies,  in  certain  instances,  have  contrasted  with  Basel  Committee  initiatives  aimed  at 
mitigating procyclicality and facilitating forward looking provisioning. More importantly, the paper 
will  highlight  how and why differences  between regulatory and accounting policies could (and 
should) be mitigated.
Key  words:  stability,  liquidity  risks,  systemic  risks,  pro  cyclicality,  fair  values,  information, 
certainty, regulation, central banks, accountability, macro prudential regulation
Fair Value Accounting and Procyclicality: Mitigating Regulatory and 
Accounting Policy Differences through Regulatory Structure Reforms and 
Enforced Self Regulation.
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
The  aftermath  of  the  recent  global  Financial  Crisis  has  witnessed  changes  to  the  structure  of 
financial  regulation,  as  well  as  policy  measures  aimed  at  fostering  financial  stability.  These 
respective  developments  are  evidenced  by  reforms  currently  being  undertaken  in  the  UK  and 
legislative  proposals  being  adopted  by  the  European  Commission  to  consolidate  Financial 
Supervision in Europe.
Whilst  a  previous  paper2 focussed  on  ways  whereby  auditing  standards  could  contribute  in 
mitigating the devastating consequences of the recent Financial Crisis, the present paper focuses on 
the issue of fair value accounting, the benefits attributed to such measurements – as well as its 
disadvantages. Some problems identified with international accounting and auditing standards prior 
to the 2007/2009 Financial Crisis, as identified in the paper include:3
− The fact that international accounting and auditing standards, on their own, do not prescribe 
rules which provide guidance of how regulation should be effectively carried out
− The inappropriateness of the scope of application of international standards.
Within  this  context,  the  role  of  regulation  and  regulatory  authorities  is  emphasised.  This  also 
underlines  why  auditing  and  accounting  standards  serve  as  complements  in  addressing  issues 
relating to financial stability, why changes to regulatory structures and further measures aimed at 
addressing systemic risks will be necessary to facilitate the (International Accounting Standards 
Board) IASB and Basel Committee's efforts.
The paper will commence with a section (section two) which discusses measures and initiatives that 
have  recently  been  undertaken by national  and  supranational  authorities  in  their  goal  to  foster 
financial stability. The section will also highlight the focus which is increasingly being placed on 
macro prudential measures as well as measures aimed at mitigating procyclicality.
Section  three  will  then  be  linked  to  section  two  through  the  all  important  need  to  foster 
accountability. It will also address how differences in regulatory and accounting policies could be 
better  reconciled  –  hence  facilitating  regulatory  convergence  as  well  as  the  harmonisation  of 
accounting and auditing standards.
Having considered the importance of transparency and the disclosure of information in fostering 
accountability  (under  section  three),  the  bridge  to  section  four  will  then  consider  the  principal 
1 School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University. Email marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2 See M Ojo,  „The Role of the IASB and Auditing Standards in the Aftermath of the 2008/2009 Financial Crisis“ 
European Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, September 2010, pp. 604–623
3 ibid
advantage attributed to fair value measurements – that is the quality of information it provides. In so 
doing, it  will link this discussion to section four which considers the contribution of fair  value 
measurements to pro cyclicality and systemic risks. Section five then proceeds with an analysis and 
discussion of recent efforts which have been undertaken at supranational level – efforts aimed at 
consolidating financial supervision. In this context, it  will consider developments and initiatives 
which have resulted in the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board and the European System 
of Financial Supervisors. It will also highlight the distinction drawn between the functions of these 
bodies through their roles in micro and macro prudential supervision.
The concluding section will  then  consider  further  areas  which need to  be addressed  under  the 
recurring theme of this paper: that is, the need to harmonise regulatory and accounting policies in 
achieving the goal of promoting financial stability.
B. Analysis of Recent Efforts Aimed at Facilitating Financial Stability: Efforts undertaken by 
national authorities, supra national authorities and international standard setting bodies 
Recent measures aimed at fostering financial stability have focussed on macro prudential measures 
as  well  as  measures  aimed  at  mitigating  pro  cyclicality.  The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision has been engaged in several initiatives, in collaboration with its introduction of Basel 
III, which are aimed at mitigating procyclicality. Such initiatives include:4
− the assessment and dampening of the cyclicality of minimum capital requirements;
− the facilitation of forward-looking provisioning; 
− the adoption of a regulatory framework for capital conservation and countercyclical buffers;
−  the introduction of a minimum leverage ratio. 
According  to  Weber,  „financial  regulation  can  be  enacted  by governmental  authorities  such  as 
parliaments, executive bodies and public institutions, and self regulatory agencies – the latter either 
having a delegated competence to devise regulations or to impose regulations on members of a 
specific market sector in a non mandatory way.“5 He also adds that the experience of the Financial 
Crisis and the present situation in financial market law, requires a rethink of theoretical concepts 
underlying international financial regulation and supervision.6
The need for changes to the structure of financial regulation in the UK became evident following 
the Northern Rock debacle which exposed weaknesses in the tripartite arangement between the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Bank of England and the Treasury. The tripartite regime is 
to be abolished – with the result that a new prudential financial services regulator will operate (as a 
subsidiary of the Bank of England).7 
4  R Moreno, „Policymaking from a Macro prudential Perspective“ BIS Working Paper No 336, January 2011 at page 
13 of 24
5 R  H  Weber,  „Mapping  and  Structuring  International  Financial  Regulation  –  A Theoretical  Approach“  20  (5) 
European Banking Law Review (2009) at page 653
6 Insodoing, he further elaborates by exmaining „three closely related theoretical concepts which offer a valuable 
framework  for  analysis  without  pre  determining  how regulatory responsibilities  should  be  allocated.“  See  RH 
Weber, „Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation and Supervision“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) 683-704 at page 687
7 See Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm>
In the words of the Chancellor,
„The Bank of England was mandated to focus on consumer price inflation to the exclusion of other things.The 
Treasury saw its financial policy division drift into a backwater.The FSA became a narrow regulator, almost entirely 
focussed on rules based regulation.No-one was controlling levels of debt, and when the crunch came no one knew 
who was in charge.“ see ibid
Prior to the Northern Rock debacle and indeed the onset of the recent Financial Crisis, many doubts 
had been expressed about the tripartite arrangement which existed between the Financial Services 
Authority, the Bank of England and the Treasury. The transfer of the Bank of England's supervisory 
powers to the FSA through the Bank of England Act 1998 had come to many as a huge surprise – 
since the Bank is better equipped in several respects relating to financial stability and should ideally 
have been involved (to a greater extent) in financial supervision than was previously the case. The 
aftermath of the 2007/08 financial crisis has witnessed the enactment of legislation such as the 
Banking Act  of  2009 which  has  not  only introduced greater  statutory powers  for  the  Bank of 
England, but also the Special Resolution Regime.8 
In addressing certain fundamental questions9 related to macro prudential regulation, an interesting 
observation was made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in underlining reasons for the intention 
to  assign  to  the  Bank  of  England  control  of  macro-prudential  regulation  and  oversight  of 
microprudential regulation.:10
„Only independent central banks have the broad macroeconomic understanding, the authority and 
the knowledge required to make the kind of macro-prudential judgments that are required now and 
in the future.“ 
He also highlighted another  important  lesson which was drawn from the recent  Crisis,  namely 
that:11
− because central banks are the lenders of last resort,  they need to be familiar with every 
aspect of the institutions that they may have to support, they must also be responsible for 
day-to-day micro-prudential regulation as well - the case being particularly strong where the 
banking system is highly concentrated as it is in the UK, where the boundary between micro 
and macro-prudential regulation is not easy to define.
In Lastra and Garicano's opinion, „the macro supervisor should be less independent than central 
banks are now in their monetary policy responsibilities.“12 They also respond to the question „How 
can giving freedom (ie independence) to unelected officials be reconciled with a society remaining 
democratic?“ with the answer: „through accountability“. 
8 For a consideration of developments which have necessitated greater involvement and a greater role for central 
banks  in  financial  regulation  and  supervision,  see   M Ojo,  „  Central  Bank's  Role  and  Involvement  in  Bank 
Regulation:  Lender of  Last  Resort  Arrangements  and the Special  Resolution Regime (SRR)  http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/15771/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420812
9 See Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm> 
In conceding to the fact that „fundamental problems of culture and regulatory structure still appear to exist“, he also 
drew attention to the following questions:
How would less box-ticking and more exercise of judgement be ensured?
What are the tools of macroprudential regulation and who should exercise them?
Can the macroprudential regulator do their job if they don’t have an intimate knowledge of what is happening in 
individual firms?
10 See Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm>
11 ibid
12 See Principle Five,  RM Lastra  and L Garicano,  „  Towards a  New Archictecture for  Financial  Stability:  Seven 
Principles“ Journal of International Economic Law 13(3) at page 616
C. Enforced Self Regulation and Accountability.
In terms of flexibility, compliance, enforcement and accountability, the Enforced Self Regulation 
model  is  considered  to  confer  greater  benefits  than  self  regulation.13 “Enforced  self  regulation 
represents  an  extension  and  individualization  of  the  “co-regulation.”  theory.  Co  regulation,  as 
distinct from enforced self regulation, is usually taken to mean industry- association self regulation 
with some oversight and/or ratification by government.14
Although the Enforced Self Regulation model is considered to offer greater possibilities whereby 
corporate agents could be held accountable – than is the case under self regulation, there is greater 
scope for such a model to be optimised under the model which incorporates both Enforced Self 
Regulation and Regulatory Competition.
With the Enforced Self Regulation and Regulatory Competition model, whilst the firm is subject to 
mandatory regulations under the Enforced Self Regulation model, it is also subjected to a second 
level of regulation under Basel II (meta regulation) – which serves as an additional check on the self 
regulatory  processes  undertaken  by  the  firm.  This  constitutes  a  reason  why  such  a  model  is 
considered to provide greater accountability than Enforced Self Regulation.
Such a model is represented diagrammatically below:
Basel Committee----->    Meta Regulation -->      State ---> Enforced Self Regulation -->
Firm
Other actors involved in the model could include trade associations and bodies which  represent 
industry and consumer interests, and non governmental organisations.
Disclosure  and  transparency  constitute  fundamental  elements  which  foster  accountability. 
Transparency  is  considered  to  be  „a  beneficial  element  in  agency  relationships  because  more 
information  about  the  agent  makes  the  agent  more  accountable  to  the  pricipal.“15 However 
circumstances whereby „committing to the concealment of certain kind of information“ could prove 
beneficial to the principal, have also been identified.16
Information, certainty and uncertainty, transparency and disclosure are all factors which contribute 
to  risk  taking  levels  and  bank  contagion.  The  potential  of  banking  regulations  and  disclosure 
requirements  to  impact  risk taking  levels  is  not  only dependent  on certain  factors  such as  the 
dissemination  of  information  to  appropriate  recipients,  appropriate  volume  of  disseminated 
information,  when to  disseminate  such information, but  also on other  factors  such as  effective 
corporate governance measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability. Ways 
whereby the disclosure and transparency of vital information for investors could serve as a source 
13 For  further  information  on  Enforced  Self  Regulation,  Self  Regulation  and  Cooperative  and  Competitive  Self 
Regulation, see M Ojo, „Cooperative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation: The Role of Governments, Private 
Actors and Banks in Corporate Responsibility“ <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1616235> and 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22918/1/MPRA_paper_22918.pdf
14I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford University Press at 
page 102; Also see P Grabosky and J Braithwaite Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business  
Regulatory Agencies, (1986) at page 83 Oxford University Press, Melbourne.
15A Prat, „The Wrong Kind of Transparency“ LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE439 October 2002 at page 5 of 51 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1160984>
16 See ibid at page 46 of 51
of  impediment  to  financial  stability  (facilitate  the  spread  of  systemic  risks),  are  therefore  also 
dependent on the timing of the disclosure of such information.
Fair value measurements are favoured in contrast to historical accounting principally because of the 
value  of  information  they  provide  and  contain  –  namely:  more  complete,  accurate  and  timely 
information. However certain concerns have been raised in relation to the extent of their  use – 
particularly in the aftermath of the recent Financial Crisis. The following section is dedicated to a 
consideration of fair value measurements and their impact on the recent Financial Crisis.
D. Contribution of Fair Value Measurements to Pro cyclicality and Systemic Risks
As  highlighted  in  a  previous  paper,17 accounting  standards'  contribution  to  procyclicality  and 
particularly, the pro cyclical nature of accounting, is attributed to two principal elements: 
− Fair value measurements
− The treatment of impairments.
Whilst results of a certain sample generated by Khan18 illustrate and support the evidence that „a 
more fair value-oriented accounting regime is associated with an increase in bank contagion above 
and beyond that which exists as a result of trade and financial linkages in the banking industry“, 
Laux and Leuz argue in contrast (and based on their analysis), that fair value accounting (frequently 
also referred to as mark-to-market accounting), is unlikely to have contributed to the severity of the 
2008 Financial Crisis in a major way.19 Furthermore, they add that „while there may have been 
downward spirals or asset fire sales in certain markets, little evidence supports the fact that such 
effects are the result of fair value accounting.“
ii) Advantages and Disadvantages of Fair Value Measurements.
The  principal  advantage  attributed  to  fair  value  measurements  has  already been  highlighted  – 
namely, the value of information they incorporate in the financial statements – such value being 
more complete and accurate than that provided by historical cost accounting.
Problems identified with fair value accounting, as highlighted by Ball, include:20
− Market  liquidity  is  a  potentially  important  issue  in  practice  and spreads  could  be  large 
enough to cause substantial uncertainty about fair values.
− In illiquid markets, trading by managers could influence traded – as well as quoted prices 
hence allowing them to manipulate fair value estimates.
17 M Ojo,  „The  Role  of  the  IASB and  Auditing Standards  in  the  Aftermath  of  the  2008/2009 Financial  Crisis“ 
European Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, September 2010, pp. 604–623 at page 612; Also see M Grande, Accounting 
and Procyclicality, Conference on Financial Reporting in a Changing World at page 2
18 U Khan, „Does Fair Value Accounting Contribute to Systemic Risks in the Banking Industry?“ at page 4 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327596>
19 See C Laux and C Leuz, „Did Fair Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?“ ECGI Working Paper 
Series  in  Finance,  Working  Paper  No  266  October  2009  at  page  3.  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1487905>
20 R Ball, „International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): Pros and Cons for Investors“ at pages 21 and 22 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929561>
− The potential for fair value accounting to become „mark to model“ accounting when liquid 
market prices are not available
− Tendency for fair value accounting to increase opportunities for manipulation when „mark 
to model“ accounting is employed to simulate market prices (since managers are able to 
influence both the choice of models and the parameter estimates).
E. Recent Efforts Aimed at Consolidating Financial Supervision at Supra national Level
In line with arrangements aimed at „sustainably reinforcing financial stability throughout the EU, 
ensuring that the same basic technical rules are applied and enforced consistently, identifying risks 
in the system at an early stage, and facilitating the ability to act together far more effectively in 
emergency  situations  and  in  resolving  disagreements  among  supervisors“,  the  European 
Commission  adopted  draft  legislation  in  2009 which  created  the  new European Systemic  Risk 
Board (ESRB) and the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS).21
Functions of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) are „to monitor and assess risks to the 
stability of the financial system as a whole ("macro-prudential supervision"), provide early warning 
of systemic risks that may be building up and, where necessary, recommendations for action to deal 
with these risks.“22
The European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) serves to supervise „individual financial 
institutions  ("micro-prudential  supervision"),  consisting  of  a  network  of  national  financial 
supervisors  working  in  tandem  with  new  European  Supervisory  Authorities,  created  by  the 
transformation of existing Committees for the banking securities and insurance and occupational 
pensions sectors.“23
In the aftermath of the launch of the three European Supervisory Authorities on the 1 January 2011, 
the Commission proposed to make changes to legislation in the areas of insurance and securities 
regulation – measures aimed at facilitating the efficient functioning of the new authorities.24
21 See European  Commission,  „Commission Adopts  Legislative  Proposals  to  Strengthen  Financial  Supervision in 
Europe“ <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1347  >.  The European System of Financial 
Supervisors comprises national supervisors and the three new European Supervisory Authorities for the banking, 
securities and insurance and occupational pension sectors.
22 Ibid;  „The ESRB will have the power to issue recommendations and warnings to Member States (including the 
national supervisors) and to the European Supervisory Authorities, which will have to comply or else explain why 
they have not done so. The heads of the ECB, national central banks, the European Supervisory Authorities, and 
national supervisors, will participate in the ESRB . The creation of the ESRB being in line with several initiatives at 
multilateral level or outside the EU, including the creation of a Financial Stability Board by the G20.“
23 „In relation to micro-prudential supervision and up till  2010, there were three financial services committees for 
micro-financial supervision (supervision of individual financial institutions) at EU level, with advisory powers only: 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions  Committee  (CEIOPS)  and  the  Committee  of  European  Securities  Regulators  (CESR).“  see  European 
Commission,  „Financial  Supervision:  Additional   Legislative  Proposals  (January  2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/index_en.htm>
24 See ibid. The ESAs, which replace the former European Committees for the banking, securities and insurance and 
occupational  pensions  sectors,  are  the  European  Banking  Authority  (EBA),  the  European  Insurance  and 
Occupational  Pensions  Authority  (EIOPA),  and  the  European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority  (ESMA).  In 
cooperation and coordination with nationally-based supervisors,  the ESAs are in place to ensure that  rules  are 
applied in a rigorous and consistent fashion throughout the European Union, to monitor developments within the 
financial system as well as to detect potential risks to financial stability.
The trio of new ESAs have taken over all of the functions of the previous committees, and in addition have certain 
additional competences, including the following:
• developing  proposals  for  technical  standards  to  better  define  common  standards  for  the  application  of 
legislative  acts,  respecting  better  regulation  principles;resolving  cases  of  disagreement  between  national 
supervisors,  where  legislation  requires  them  to  cooperate  or  to  agree;contributing  to  ensuring  consistent 
In  line  with measures  aimed at  mitigating procyclicality and its  facilitation of  forward-looking 
provisioning,  the Basel  Committee is  supporting a move towards an expected loss approach in 
accounting standards -  this being in line with risk management considerations that suggest that 
„loan-loss  provisions  should be forward looking.“25 This  approach is  contrasted26 to  accounting 
standards, and particularly IAS 39, which traditionally require banks to provision based on specific 
“incurred loss” not expected loss.  Further,  it  is  added that „whilst the adoption of international 
accounting standards contributes to financial stability by limiting the scope for arbitrary earnings 
manipulation,  in  a  number  of  cases  it  has  implied  lower  loan-loss  provisioning than  many 
supervisors would have considered prudent during the expansion phase of the cycle.“27
F. Conclusion: Further Issues to Be Addressed
Harmonising Views Relating to Accounting and Regulatory Definitions
1) Expected Losses and Non Expected Losses: 
Capital constitutes a means of addressing expected losses – as well as recent initiatives undertaken 
by the Basel Committee to focus on buffers.
According  to Laeven  and  Majnoni,28 regulatory  capital,  “should  cope  with  the  occurrence  of 
unexpected  losses  –  that  is,  losses  that  are  large  but  infrequent  and  further,  loan  loss  reserves 
should,  instead,  cope with expected losses.”  In reconciling the different  views held about bank 
capital requirements, they propose a partitioning of regulatory capital which is based not only on 
terms relating to priority (as is the case for Tier One and Tier Two Capital), but also (and foremost)
on risk management considerations.29
2) Addressing weaknesses in existing macro prudential arrangements
Recent initiatives aimed at fostering financial stability (as evidenced by steps taken in the UK) have 
resulted  in  the  macroprudential  supervisory function  being transferred to  the  central  bank.  The 
Financial Services Authority is considered to have been endowed with adequate mechanisms of 
accountability.30 It  will  be  quite  interesting  to  see  how  the  new  prudential  financial  services 
regulator operates as a subsidiary of the Bank of England.
The relationship between micro and micro supervisors, it is argued, „must be articulated through a 
management  by  exception  system  involving  direct  authority  of  the  macro  supervisor  over 
enforcement and allocation of tasks.“31
application of existing and future technical EU rules (including through peer reviews);a coordination role in 
emergency situations.
25„That is, take into account expected credit losses over the medium term „ See R Moreno, Policymaking from a macro 
prudential perspective BIS Working Paper No 336, January 2011 at page 13 of 24
26 ibid
27 ibid
28 See L Laeven and G Majnoni, „Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns: Too Much, Too Late? at page 6
29 ibid
30 See M Ojo, „The Financial Services Authority: A Model of Improved Accountability?“ Global Journal of Business 
Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 83-96, 2007
31 RM Lastra and L Garicano, „ Towards a New Archictecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles“ Journal of 
At  supra  national  level  and  as  is  the  case  with  the  harmonisation  of  accounting  and  auditing 
standards, the EU faces a daunting task in respect of supervision and harmonisation. In response to 
the difficulties presented by convergence, the vital role it assumes in the standard setting process, 
and given the fact that it is considered by some to be an unfeasible objective, calls have been made 
for a re-think of the way in which it is implemented.32
3) Enforcement
As recently acknowledged by the Basel Committee,33 „better and more intrusive supervision at the 
global level“, as well as the implementation of stronger mechanisms aimed at ensuring that the 
execution of standards and regulations established by the Committee and approved by the G20, are 
successfully enforced, constitute some of the efforts which have been undertaken and which need to 
be undertaken, if enforcement is to be facilitated.
Why  should  differences  between  regulatory  and  accounting  policies  be  mitigated?  Because 
mitigating such differences could facilitate convergence – as well as financial stability. A greater 
degree  of  oversight  by  the  State  in  respect  of  its  regulation  of  accountancy  bodies  (and  the 
accountancy profession - as opposed to a system where self regulation of the accountancy bodies 
predominantly exists), as well as greater collaboration between international standard setters such as 
the  IASB,  FASB  and  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  would  also  facilitate  the 
convergence of accounting, auditing and regulatory policies.
International Economic Law 13(3) at page 597
32 The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) in particular, has called for a re think in the way in which 
convergence  is  implemented.  See  FEE's  statement  „Future  Approach  to  Setting  Global   Financial  Reporting 
Standards:  A  New  Approach  to  Setting  Global  Financial  Reporting  Standards“  at  page  2 
<http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0907feepolicy.pdf>
33 In order to achieve this goal, the Committee will also be making efforts to conduct follow up and peer reviews whose 
areas of focus will include the common interpretating of standards and potential sources of regulatory arbitrage. See 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III and Beyond“ and Remarks of Nout Wellink,  Chairman, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and President, De Nederlandsche Bank in relation to the conference  High Level  
Meeting on Better Supervision and Better Banking in a Post-crisis Era, FSI and EMEAP Working Group on Banking 
Supervision (hosted by Bank Negara Malaysia) on the 17th January 2011 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110118.pdf>
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(In relation to  the entire text and diagrams within this  section/appendix,  see pages 4-8,  Impact 
Assessment Report of the:
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of the European Parliament and the Council on marco prudential oversight of the financial system 
and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/20090923_im
pact_en.pdf)
Figure 1 Problem Tree Micro Prudential Supervision  (see page 5 of the Impact Assessment 
Report)


Figure 2: Problem Tree Macro Prudential Supervision

